The South China Sea in China's Strategic tactical

The South China Sea is considered a crucial strategic location, being home to some of the busiest shipping routes in the world as well as potential natural resource deposits such as oil and gas. Parts of the sea are contested by multiple claimants, including China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan. 

While the global coronavirus pandemic continues to dominate the headlines, Asia’s flashpoints continue to simmer. The South China Sea is no exception, as evidenced by recent developments including China-Vietnam tensions. Journalist Robert Kaplan calls the South China Sea “the 21st century’s defining battleground,” the “throat of global sea routes.”

A storyline has developed over the last few weeks suggesting that China is taking advantage of global distraction during the pandemic to increase its assertiveness in the South China Sea

Diplomatic Game

There are probably three diplomatic tracks worth paying attention to.

First, the ASEAN-China COC negotiations which continue to shuffle forward zombie-like without any real progress.

The second track is the bilateral consultative mechanisms, especially that between Manila and Beijing. The MOU on joint exploration for oil and gas signed by Xi and Duterte in October 2018 set a one-year goal for a final deal. That didn’t happen because, as was clear at the time, they were talking about two wildly different models.

Third is the dark horse: will Vietnam get so fed up with the continued failures of the COC progress amid increasing Chinese bullying that it pursues a parallel diplomatic option, either with fellow claimants or through an external mechanism like UNCLOS conciliation or arbitration procedures? Unlikely, but repeats of last year’s oil and gas standoff (which seems like it might be brewing at this moment) or a loss of life due to another collision could alter the calculus of decision makers.

If the assumption that the South China Sea is China’s ‘blue land’ is taken to its logical conclusion by attempting to eject other nations from commercial or military operations within the area encompassed by the ‘nine-dash line’, the consequences for China’s relationship with the other states bounding the South China Sea will be disastrous, however strong China’s historic claims to its features may be. It will also have profound implications for the way that China is regarded in the wider region and globally.

The truth is, in military terms, this step is unnecessary. A rational Chinese military strategy that understands the differences between continental and maritime should be pursued, but it’s not necessarily being pursued.

A unified strategy of Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia is indeed central to containing China. The joint patrols would send a strong message to China to stop provocative steps. At the same time, the countries like US, Japan, Australia and India should be providing assistance to these countries and should be prepared to join their patrols occasionally whenever required.

 The ASEAN should play the central role to manage dispute in the region and external powers should empower/support this group. India, US, Australia, India and Japan should help the smaller nations to give a formal shape to this strategy to deter China from continuing its ‘bullying tactics’ in the SCS.